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Cambodia 1. Introduction 
For those charged with the conservation of wildlife, one of the most 
critical questions faced is how best to use the resources at their disposal 
to effect desired outcomes. Yet, as the practice of conservation and the 
science underlying it have evolved, this question has in many ways be­
come more difﬁcult to answer. In the early days of conservation, forcible 
evictions from protected areas (PAs) and the removal of access or use 
rights to the resources within were commonplace (Adams, 2004), the 
legacy of which is still clearly visible today as PAs and the enforcement 
of access restrictions continue to be the mainstay of conservation efforts 
around the world. The underlying logic of this approach of the separa­
tion of nature and people is simple but in practice can be difﬁcult to po­
lice effectively, not least because the establishment and enforcement of 
PAs may inﬂict signiﬁcant negative impacts on local people (Adams et 
al., 2004; Brockington et al., 2006; Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; 
Colchester, 2004). Recognition of this and the resentment it fosters 
has helped to give rise to a raft of less punitive incentive- and rights-
based approaches to conservation, most notably integrated re for Conservation Science, 
en Building, S Parks Rd, Oxford 
. 
. This is an open access article underconservation and developments projects (Barrett and Arcese, 1995; 
Wells and Brandon, 1993), community based natural resource manage­
ment (Kellert et al., 2000; Singleton, 2000) and payments for ecosystem 
services (Engel et al., 2008; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wunder, 2007). Yet, 
while these developments have signiﬁcantly expanded the options 
available to conservation managers, the question of which approach, 
or combination thereof, is most likely to result in the best outcomes 
for conservation in any given situation remains. 
This has brought increasing attention to evidence-based approaches 
to improving conservation decision-making and evaluating whether or 
not conservation interventions have been successful in achieving their 
stated goals (Pullin and Knight, 2003; Sutherland et al., 2004; Stem et 
al., 2005; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Pullin and Knight, 2009). But 
the success of conservation interventions is often difﬁcult to deﬁne or 
measure and may be highly dependent on the local social, political, eco­
nomic and institutional context (McShane et al., 2011). In many cases, 
despite a wealth of case studies of how particular approaches have 
been applied, there is insufﬁcient evidence of outcomes or post-project 
monitoring to be able to draw conclusions (see recent reviews of the ef­
ﬁcacy of livelihood based approaches for examples of this problem; Roe 
et al., 2015; Wicander and Coad, 2015). Where advances have been 
made, such as through the application of quasi-experimental matching 
approaches (e.g. Andam et al., 2008, 2010; Arriagada et al., 2012; 
Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Clements et al., 2016; Clements and  the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). 
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ments, they require technical expertise that may not be available to con­
servation managers to be done well, are expensive (Agrawal, 2014) and  
are conducted after projects have been implemented for long enough to 
provide sufﬁcient data to make the assessment. As such, even if ap­
proaches such as adaptive management (Salafsky et al., 2002; Stem et 
al., 2005) have been put in place to allow for changes in project imple­
mentation in light of new evidence, opportunities for improvements, 
time or goodwill may be lost in the interim. From the perspective of con­
servation managers, whose immediate concerns are more likely to be 
the programmes under their control rather than furthering a wider 
body of knowledge, more relevant tools are those that enable them to 
estimate the effects of interventions prior to implementation (either 
in absolute terms or relative to alternative options). Such predictive 
tools offer the potential to get things right ﬁrst time and guide deci­
sion-making to minimise the risk of unnecessary failures. 
One option is to pilot approaches on a small scale. However, when 
the aim of an intervention is to effect behaviour change and subsequent 
ecological outcomes, detectable change can take a long time to occur. 
Even in situations where a change can be detected, it can be difﬁcult 
to control for other possible drivers of that change or to persuade donors 
to fund the additional monitoring necessary to do so (Saterson et al., 
2004). Yet the alternative, predicting the future response of those 
targeted by conservation programmes, is rarely considered, with the re­
sult that expert judgement and experience are often relied upon (Fazey 
et al., 2004; Pullin and Knight, 2005; Cook et al., 2010). Such approaches 
are often ﬂawed or based on insufﬁcient evidence, and so may lead to 
inferior outcomes, particularly for the complex contexts typically en­
countered in conservation. 
In this paper, we employ a simple alternative, scenario-based 
interviewing, that overcomes the shortcomings of such approaches by 
providing evidence of probable responses to a range of possible inter­
ventions or policy changes prior to their implementation. Although sce­
nario-based approaches have often been used in environmental 
sciences to predict changes under conceivable futures (Alcamo, 2001), 
their use to date in conservation has so far been limited (see Cinner et 
al., 2009 for an exception to this). Yet, by limiting the length of time 
and changes considered within each scenario, scenario-based ap­
proaches can be used to control for contextual complexity to produce 
meaningful predictions of behaviour (Gordon, 1992), making them 
highly suitable for predicting conservation outcomes under different 
policy or intervention conditions. 
As scenarios are presented in the form of qualitative narratives, they 
can be easily understood by respondents, which enable them to be used 
to examine behaviour in contexts that might be more difﬁcult to inves­
tigate using alternative methods. Discussing the future in this way pro­
vides valuable insight into not only how people are likely to respond to 
the scenarios presented, but also the reasons why they might respond 
that way. It can also serve to help minimise the risks presented by het­
erogeneity amongst the target populations for conservation interven­
tions, or by exogenous changes such as external market ﬂuctuations. 
Accounting for such complexity is one of the principal challenges facing 
conservation; something that integrated conservation and develop­
ment projects are often said to have failed to do (Blom et al., 2010; 
McShane and Newby, 2004; Waylen et al., 2012). In part, this is because 
conservation often operates within highly complex socio-ecological sys­
tems in which relationships between society and natural systems are 
dynamic and multi-scale (Berkes, 2004). Even at the site level, heteroge­
neity within target populations may be high (Chan et al., 2007; Waylen 
et al., 2013). Scenario-based approaches enable the response to conser­
vation interventions to be tested for different agents and, hence, the ex­
tent of homogeneity of response to be estimated for a target group. 
Such qualitative methods are not without limitations however. For 
example, the ability of respondents to accurately forecast their actions 
reduces as scenarios become more complicated. There is also a possibil­
ity of strategic responses (Carson and Groves, 2007), particularly in situations in which respondents may prefer the implementation of 
one particular scenario over another, or social desirability bias, whereby 
responses may be inﬂuenced by the desire to conform to social norms 
and be viewed favourably by others (Fisher, 1993). Although such lim­
itations are impossible to negate entirely, careful follow up questioning 
and triangulation of responses can do much to improve the external va­
lidity of results. 
Here, we use scenario-based interviews to examine the potential 
outcomes of different approaches to changing incentives within Keo 
Seima Wildlife Sanctuary, a protected area in eastern Cambodia. We 
do this through an analysis of the stated responses of smallholder 
farmers from several villages within the project area to seven future sce­
narios, which include exogenous changes to the sale price of cassava 
(the dominant agricultural commodity in the area) and different inter­
vention options aimed at reducing deforestation at the site (increased 
enforcement effort, communal and individual conditional payments 
and a village fund for infrastructural development). For each scenario, 
interview respondents were asked how their land use and livelihood 
practices might change and, hence, the responses given provide an indi­
cation of the expected variation in farmer reactions to the intervention 
options under consideration at the study site. Within this methodolog­
ical framework, we investigate the predicted effectiveness of each op­
tion for incentivising reductions in forest clearance and compare this 
against the response to exogenous changes in the price of cassava. By 
analysing responses at the household level but within three distinct 
livelihood zones, we examine the effect of economic well-being and 
livelihood strategy on the responses given to each scenario. In this 
way, we seek to identify, in the context of our case study, which inter­
vention would result in the greatest reduction in household deforesta­
tion and whether opportunities exist to target interventions towards 
the livelihood zones with households most likely to respond positively. 
2. The Keo Seima Wildlife Sanctuary REDD+ demonstration project 
Keo Seima Wildlife Sanctuary (formerly Seima Protection Forest) is a 
protected area located in eastern Cambodia and covers an area of 
2927 km2 consisting of a complex mosaic of forest types that is rich in 
biodiversity (Fig. 1; Evans et al., 2012). Management of the PA is split 
into a core protection zone and outside buffer areas. Since 2002, the 
site has been managed by the Cambodian government, with technical 
and ﬁnancial assistance provided by the Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS), and has been designated as one of two national REDD+demon­
stration sites since 2010. 
The PA is characterised into three livelihood zones in which different 
livelihood activities dominate: a cash crop zone, a lowland paddy zone 
and an upland zone. These zones reﬂect the major inter-community 
heterogeneity with respect to bio-physical characteristics, institutional 
framing, opportunity costs of stopping deforestation and economic 
well-being. As such, the majority of variation in clearance behaviour is 
expected to be represented by these zones. The cash crop zone is 
characterised by easy road access and mature cash crop markets (pre­
dominantly cashew and cassava, with some rubber) and is currently 
experiencing the highest rate of land conversion (WCS, 2013). The low­
land paddy zone is located in the most remote part of the site. Access to 
this area is difﬁcult (particularly during the wet season) and the domi­
nant livelihood strategy is centred on the cultivation of paddy rice, sup­
ported by liquid resin collection from native dipterocarp trees. The 
upland zone is also located further from market centres, although access 
is largely better than for the paddy zone. In this zone, households culti­
vate a greater diversity of crops, including upland rice varieties, vegeta­
bles and maize, and have recently made the transition towards 
commercial production of cassava and cashew. It has previously been 
shown that economic well-being as measured by the basic necessity 
score, a participatory poverty score calculated as a weighted proportion 
of a list of assets and services that a household owns or has access to 
(Davies and Smith, 1998), varies between the three livelihood zones 
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Fig. 1. Map of the site showing sampled villages in the three livelihood zones. (Travers and Evans, 2013), with households in the cash crop zone better 
off on average than households from villages in the other two zones. 
Within each zone, heterogeneity in poverty score at the household 
level is high. 
Although, household livelihoods within the project area have tradi­
tionally been based on subsistence agriculture and the collection of for­
est products (Evans et al., 2003), increasingly farmers are turning 
towards the production of cash crops, such as cassava and cashew, 
and encroaching further into the protected area (Travers et al., 2015). 
Immigration of households seeking land from neighbouring provinces 
has helped to drive expansion of agricultural land and fuel encroach­
ment (Milne, 2013; Travers et al., 2015). While these two processes 
are helping to drive deforestation within the proposed REDD+ project 
area, the rate and extent of change vary between villages. 
A programme of participatory tenure reform is currently underway 
or complete in 15 of the 20 villages participating in the REDD+ project 
(A. Diment, pers. comm.). Under this process, communal land title is 
granted to each ofﬁcially recognised indigenous community, with land 
inside village boundaries divided into different use areas. Land use in­
side the communal title is governed by a set of rules designed to protect 
customary practices and ensure long-term sustainable use of communal 
land. Clearance of forest is only permitted inside designated community 
areas. Hence, clearance outside the titled area is illegal and subject to 
enforcement by PA authorities. However, arrests are only made when 
offenders are caught in the act of clearing so detection rates are low 
and vary throughout the landscape. Clearance inside community areas 
is governed by village institutions. 
At the time that data collection for this study took place, ﬁve indige­
nous communities living within the boundaries of the protected area 
had received ofﬁcial communal land title. Assistance for this process 
was prioritised in the most accessible villages subject to both high im­
migration and increasing commercialisation of agriculture because 
land and forest resources were judged to be under the greatest threat 
in these villages. This has added to the institutional complexity across 
the study site, as different villages are now at various points along the 
tenure reform process. In theory, the areas granted to indigenous com­
munities in recognition of their customary rights should reduce pres­
sure on the forest outside community boundaries but the reality has 
so far been very different, with clearance rates high both inside and outside titled areas (Travers et al., 2015). One of the principal aims of ac­
tivities undertaken as part of the REDD+ project will be to incentivise 
communities to restrict clearance in areas designated to community 
use through the tenure reform process. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Survey design 
All households surveyed as part of this study were randomly select­
ed from a list of households that had previously participated in a wider 
household survey conducted in each of the study villages. Only house­
hold heads were interviewed, with an alternative household selected 
if a selected household head was unavailable at the time of the survey. 
This meant it was possible to stratify each household by two variables: 
poverty score and livelihood zone. Sampling was spread equally across 
poverty score terciles, which were derived for the whole survey area, 
and the three livelihood zones, such that an equal proportion of house­
holds from the three poverty score terciles were interviewed for each 
zone. In total, 45 households were interviewed: ﬁve households for 
each poverty score tercile in each of the three livelihood zones. For 
each livelihood zone, two or three villages were selected so as to cover 
the full range of conditions found in villages within each zone. Two vil­
lages were selected in both the upland (n = 7 and 8) and cash crop 
(n = 9 and 6) zones and three villages in the paddy zone (n = 4, 4 
and 7). The number of households sampled in each village varied with 
the availability of household heads from each of the three poverty 
terciles. 
Interviews were semi-structured, with respondents presented with 
a baseline business as usual scenario and a further six scenarios in 
which one aspect of future conditions was changed. Scenarios were 
presented sequentially, with respondents asked to explain how their 
agricultural and other livelihood activities would change over a ﬁve 
year period. Follow-up questions were asked to explore responses in 
greater detail and to triangulate between responses to different 
scenarios. 
As the research involved human participants and centred on illegal 
behaviour, verbal informed consent was received from all respondents. 
Land-use is a potentially sensitive issue in Cambodian protected areas 
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dential and all data were anonymised before being shared with WCS. In 
order to check for errors, a subsample of responses from two villages 
was validated by comparing landholdings reported during the scenario 
interviews with those reported in Travers et al. (2015), with all re­
sponses comparing favourably. 
The study was reviewed and approved under Imperial College 
London's procedures for research ethics approval. 
3.2. Scenarios 
The scenarios presented to respondents were developed to repre­
sent different intervention options under consideration to reduce 
smallholder land clearance at the site. Consequently, the parameters 
selected for each scenario were chosen to reﬂect the most likely option 
for that scenario at the time the ﬁeldwork was undertaken (March 
2013). These scenarios were piloted in four interviews to ensure that 
they were understandable and credible to respondents. Hypotheses re­
garding the expected response to individual scenarios relative to a 
baseline business as usual scenario or to scenarios representing other 
institutional changes were developed from the authors' prior under­
standing of the site and the behaviour of resident smallholder farmers. 
This enabled a priori  expectations to be assessed against predicted 
behaviour. 
3.2.1. Baseline business as usual scenario 
In this scenario, it was explained that current conditions or trends 
would stay constant over the next ﬁve years. All average prices would 
remain at a stable level, although some small variation could be expect­
ed between years. Law enforcement effort would remain constant but, 
in cases where indigenous land title had yet to be granted, tenure re­
forms would progress as currently planned. As such, respondents 
were asked to predict their expected clearance under business as 
usual institutional arrangements. 
3.2.2. Performance payments 
In these three scenarios, respondents were offered the option of re­
ceiving an annual payment of $200, which equates to approximately 
10% of average household earnings, in return for agreeing not to clear 
any additional land, including inside areas designated for use under 
communal land title. Payments were set at $200 as this was felt to be 
representative of the likely sum offered in the future as part of the 
REDD+ project (T. Evans, pers. comm.). In the ﬁrst of these scenarios, 
payments were to be made on an individual basis and were dependent 
solely on the compliance of the household interviewed. In the second 
scenario, payments would be made based on the behaviour of groups 
of ten individual households from within the same neighbourhood as 
the respondent household. Each household would receive $200 if all 
households in the group chose not to clear any additional land, other­
wise they would receive nothing. In the third of these scenarios, $200 
would be paid into a village level development fund to support infra­
structural development or other development projects identiﬁed by 
the community and would again be dependent on the collective behav­
iour of groups of ten households from the same neighbourhood. It was 
expected that collectively conditional performance payments would 
perform better than individual payments because individuals would 
be less willing to clear if that meant that others in their village would 
lose out. 
Hypothesis H1. The offer of performance payments will reduce predicted 
forest clearance relative to a) the business as usual baseline, and b) the in­
creased enforcement effort scenario (see next scenario). 
Hypothesis H2. The two collectively conditional performance payments 
will reduce predicted forest clearance more than payments conditional 
only on individual compliance, but the type of collective payment offered 
will not make a difference to land expansion. 3.2.3. Increased enforcement effort 
Unlike the rate of successful prosecution and the subsequent sever­
ity of sentences, the effectiveness of law enforcement patrols in detect­
ing illegal clearance in under the control of conservation managers. In 
the increased enforcement effort scenario, respondents were told that 
enforcement effort within the study site would be doubled, such that 
it would be twice as likely that illegal land clearance would be detected. 
The likelihood of prosecution once caught was unaffected. This addi­
tional enforcement activity would be restricted to conservation areas, 
i.e. clearance inside titled areas designated for communal agricultural 
use would not be subject to increased law enforcement as these areas 
are subject to community management. 
Hypothesis H3. Doubling the probability of detection will decrease pre­
dicted forest clearance relative to the business as usual baseline. 
3.2.4. Cassava prices 
For these two scenarios, respondents were asked to imagine that the 
price of cassava halved or doubled over the next ﬁve years, with some 
small yearly variation. Cassava has quickly become the dominant com­
mercial crop grown in most areas of the study site and the price at 
which farmers are able to sell this crop is of particular importance in de­
termining future land use (H. Travers, pers. obs.). However, the cassava 
market in the project area is imperfect and prices can be volatile. 
These two scenarios were included to explore the effect that a consis­
tent increase or decrease in average cassava prices would have on future 
forest clearance and to compare the effect of such changes against those 
predicted to result from conservation interventions. 
Hypothesis H4. Doubling the price of cassava will increase predicted for­
est clearance relative to the business as usual baseline. 
Hypothesis H5. Halving the price of cassava will decrease predicted forest 
clearance relative to the business as usual baseline. 
3.3. Analysis 
Responses to the six scenarios were compared against those to the 
baseline business as usual scenario. Responses were then coded into dif­
ferent categories depending on their likely impact on forest cover. In 
certain cases, in which direct changes in clearance behaviour were not 
described, coding was based on existing understanding and knowledge 
of land use practices within the study area. For example, where respon­
dents intended to buy land already in use, this was coded as a resultant 
increase in forest clearance as it is common practice for individuals to 
clear forest speciﬁcally for sale or to sell land within village boundaries 
but subsequently clear additional forest to compensate for the loss 
(Milne, 2013). In both instances, the act of buying land fuels additional 
indirect clearance. Where the conditions presented within a scenario 
were contingent on the behaviour of others, interview respondents 
were asked to describe their response to the scenario based on whether 
others in their group cleared. Responses were then coded as conditional 
or unconditional depending on whether they were contingent on the 
behaviour of others or not. 
Two Bayesian hierarchical ordered logistic regression models were 
constructed to analyse the effect of the different scenarios considered 
on household land clearance. Each model used ‘individual’ as a grouping 
factor to account for the pseudo-replication introduced through survey 
participants providing responses to multiple scenarios. Village was not 
included as a grouping factor as spatial and institutional variation 
were captured by including livelihood zone as a predictor variable. 
The ﬁrst of the two models analysed conditional responses (those de­
pendent on the reciprocation of others) and the second unconditional 
responses (those independent of reciprocation). In each case, the re­
sponse variable could take one of three states: reduce clearance, no 
change or increase clearance relative to the baseline business as usual 
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 scenario. Two predictor variables were included in the models: a re­
sponse level variable representing the scenario responded to and an in­
dividual level variable for the livelihood zone in which each respondent 
lived. Other household socio-demographic predictors were not included 
in the ﬁnal models presented in Section 4 because they were not found 
to be signiﬁcantly associated with behavioural responses (for details see 
Supplementary materials; Table A.1). 
All analysis was conducted using the package rstan, version 2.8.0 
(Stan Development Team, 2015a), in R, version 3.2.2 (R Core Team,
2015). Following the Stan reference manual (Stan Development Team, 
2015b), weakly informative half-Cauchy prior distributions (mean = 
0, std. dev. = 5) were assigned to predictor standard errors and an un­
informative LKJ prior (shape factor = 1) was assigned to the covariance 
matrix. Gelman-Rubin statistics with values ≤ 1.01 were taken to indi­
cate adequate convergence. Four chains were analysed, with 1000 
warm up iterations and a further 4000 sample iterations for each 
chain. Credible intervals for probability estimates were found at the 
95% level by calculating the probability distribution of each response 
state occurring using the estimated parameter values for each of the 
16,000 post-warm up runs. 
4. Results 
Under the baseline business as usual scenario, 82% of respondents 
reported that they would continue to increase their agricultural land 
over the next ﬁve years, while the remaining 18% stated that they had 
no intention of expanding their land. This illustrates the high level of 
smallholder forest clearance at the site. The coded responses of each 
household showed signiﬁcant variation between scenarios, ranging 
from a large increase in the rate of forest clearance under increased cas­
sava prices to a potentially large decrease under collective payments or 
a village development fund. Overall, however, a high proportion of re­
spondents reported that their behaviour would be unaffected by the 
conditions presented. This proportion was particularly high for both 
the enforcement and individual payment scenarios, for which only 
11% of respondents reported that they would change their behaviour 
relative to business as usual. The results of the two regression models 
conﬁrm many of the observational results above (Fig. 2). 
4.1. Options for beneﬁt sharing  
The two collective payment scenarios performed signiﬁcantly better 
than individually contracted payments. Provided others in the group re­
ciprocated, the probability of a household reducing clearance relative to Fig. 2. Response predicted by the two regression models of conditional andthe baseline scenario was 0.73 (95%CI: 0.15–1) for the collective pay­
ments scenario and 0.40 for the village fund scenario (95%CI: 
0.05–0.84), but only 0.02 (95%CI: 0.00–0.09) for the individual pay­
ment scenario (Fig. 2). The probability that the reduction in clearance 
was higher than the individual payment was 0.9998 for the collective 
payment scenario and 0.9979 for the village fund. However, this effect 
was only observed for conditional responses. When unconditional 
responses were considered, the probability that clearance was lower 
for the collective payment and village fund scenarios than for the 
individual payment was only 0.49 and 0.79 respectively. This illustrates 
the considerable importance of collective action if group level incentives 
are to be effective. As such, there is strong support for Hypothesis H1a, 
plus strong support for Hypothesis H2 with regard to collective payments 
and weak support with regard the village fund, but only when reciprocal 
behaviour is considered. 
These results show that the two collectively conditional perfor­
mance payments had the potential to be the most effective beneﬁt shar­
ing options at reducing forest clearance. Crucially, however, this 
reduction was dependent on the high proportion of respondents who 
stated that their response was conditional on the cooperation of others. 
This group was evenly split into two categories: those households who 
would only stop clearing provided that most or all others in their group 
reciprocated and those who would only clear if most or all others in 
their group cleared also. Consequently, while both scenarios potentially 
offer a signiﬁcant reduction in clearance, there is a risk that compliance 
would be undermined: ﬁrst by the minority of respondents who 
rejected the payment outright and subsequently by those respondents 
who would only cooperate if everyone else did likewise. 
Responses to the individual payments scenario were similarly nu­
anced. While the majority of respondents rejected the offer of $200, 
the reasons for doing so varied. For many of the respondents, the pay­
ment offered was simply insufﬁcient to compensate for the opportunity 
costs of halting agricultural expansion. Other respondents raised the 
concern that if they did not clear any more land, their land currently 
in use would gradually lose fertility and they had insufﬁcient land to ro­
tate cultivation. In these cases, some respondents reported that they 
would be happy to comply with the conditions of the payment once 
they had secured sufﬁcient land. In other cases, however, respondents 
rejected the payment conditions even though the projected earnings 
of the land they proposed to clear (based on current earnings from the 
land they held already) were lower than the payment offered. For 
these households, the reasons for clearing related less to the potential 
income from the land but rather in securing land for their family's fu­
ture. Concerns were frequently raised that, unless cleared, the land  unconditional behaviour averaged across the three livelihood zones. 
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Cambodia. A similar concern related to whether sufﬁcient land would 
be available when their children married. In these cases, the opportuni­
ty cost of not clearing related less to the potential income that could be 
generated than to perceived failures in the long-term management of 
the land titling process. 
4.2. Enforcement vs beneﬁt sharing  
One of the decisions facing PA authorities in Seima is how best to in­
vest REDD+ revenues to reduce forest clearance. To this end, we com­
pared investment in the most effective beneﬁt sharing option, collective 
payments, with investment in additional enforcement effort. However, 
doubling the detection rate for illegal clearance had only a 0.02 
(95%CI: 0.00–0.08) probability of reducing clearance relative to the 
baseline estimated (Fig. 2). This provides no support for Hypothesis 
H3 that increasing the rate of detection would reduce predicted forest 
clearance. Similarly, assuming that cooperation is reciprocated amongst 
groups under the collective payment scenario, increased enforcement 
effort was found to be a poor alternative to beneﬁt sharing (the proba­
bility that clearance would be reduced more under collective payments 
was 0.9996), providing strong support for Hypothesis H1b. 
One of the reasons behind the lack of effectiveness of the enforce­
ment scenario lies in the recent land tenure reforms that have been im­
plemented throughout the study area. In all but one of the villages 
sampled, indigenous communal land title has been granted or is in the 
process of being applied for. Consequently, land has been identiﬁed 
for future expansion of agricultural activities in each village. As such, 
clearance on this land is not subject to law enforcement by protected 
area staff, but governed by community land use rules drawn up by the 
overseeing village committee. Interview respondents were therefore 
able to claim that they would be unaffected by increased law enforce­
ment effort as none of their proposed expansion would encroach on 
conservation areas. 
4.3. Heterogeneity of response 
Understanding how responses to different intervention scenarios 
vary spatially and between households can help PA authorities to iden­
tify opportunities for targeting interventions in speciﬁc areas or at dif­
ferent groups. In this instance, separating responses by livelihood zone 
revealed signiﬁcant potential differences in behaviour. The greatest dif­
ference resulted from over 50% of respondents in the cash crop zone Fig. 3. Response predicted by the regression model of behaviour condireporting no expansion under business as usual conditions, either be­
cause they felt that they already had sufﬁcient land, there was no land 
available to be cleared or they did not want to clear land illegally. 
Under the two collective performance payment scenarios, reduc­
tions in household clearance were signiﬁcantly affected by livelihood 
zone (Fig. 3). For collective payments, the probability of reductions in 
clearance was greater in 99.7% of runs in the upland zone and in 86.8% 
of runs in the paddy zone than in the cash crop zone. For the village 
fund, the probability of reductions was greater in 99.1% of runs in the 
upland zone and in 97.7% of runs in the paddy zone than in the cash 
crop zone. This strongly suggests that implementing performance pay­
ments in the paddy and upland zones would lead to greater reductions 
in overall forest clearance than if they were implemented in the cash 
crop zone. 
In contrast to separating responses by livelihood zone, very little dif­
ference was apparent between households with different socio-demo­
graphic characteristics, suggesting that differences between the 
conditions in the three livelihood zones may have greater inﬂuence on 
decision-making than individual household heterogeneity. 
4.4. Conservation interventions vs exogenous price changes 
While the rapid commercialisation of agriculture has resulted in sig­
niﬁcantly increased household incomes in areas that have beneﬁted 
from it, the rate of change threatens to swamp interventions aimed at 
controlling the expansion of agricultural land. It is therefore informative 
to compare responses under the exogenous price changes scenarios and 
the most effective conservation intervention, collective payments. 
For the scenario in which the sale price of cassava doubled, the aver­
age predicted probability that households would increase clearance rel­
ative to business as usual was 0.22 (95%CI: 0.01–0.76), providing some 
support for Hypothesis H4 (Fig. 2). Not only does this illustrate the sig­
niﬁcant impact that this one crop has on the landscape, but it also high­
lights the risk that the positive effects of investment in beneﬁt sharing  
could be undermined by exogenous changes. However, a closer look 
at how responses were predicted to vary between the three livelihood 
zones reveals that a meaningful increase in household clearance was 
only found for households in the cash crop zone (probability of in­
crease = 0.603 for the cash crop zone, 0.14 for the paddy zone and 
0.11 for the upland zone; Fig. 3). This suggests that price rises for cassa­
va would be unlikely to affect beneﬁt sharing interventions in the paddy 
and upland zones, where they are predicted to be most effective, but 
would probably result in a signiﬁcant increase in clearance in the cash tional on the reciprocation of others displayed by livelihood zone. 
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tions considered in this study. 
In contrast, the probability that the scenario in which the cassava 
price halved resulted lower clearance relative to business as usual was 
only 0.07 (95%CI: 0.00–0.21), providing very little support for 
Hypothesis H5 (Fig. 2). While the exogenous price reduction did result 
in marginally greater reductions in clearance than both the enforcement 
and individual payment scenarios, responses to collective performance 
payments still led to signiﬁcantly higher reductions in clearance than 
that resulting from price reductions. The majority of respondents also 
reported that their income would suffer under cassava price reductions, 
as alternative livelihood options available to them are less proﬁtable. 
This suggests that households may become locked into cassava farming 
with the result that declining prices would not be sufﬁcient to reduce 
forest clearance. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Intervention effectiveness 
Our results show that there is reason for PA authorities at the study 
site to be hopeful that judicious investment of REDD+ revenues can 
dramatically reduce the number of smallholder households involved 
in agricultural expansion, and in turn reduce clearance of biodiversity 
rich forest. Both of the collective beneﬁt sharing options resulted in sig­
niﬁcant predicted reductions in agricultural expansion in comparison to 
a continuation of business as usual. The caveat to this, however, is that 
reductions were observed for the conditional behaviour model. This re­
sult is in common with other studies that have stressed the importance 
of creating a strong sense of collective action in conditional payments 
(Kerr et al., 2014; Reynolds, 2012). This could be supported by under­
taking a participatory approach to designing the distribution of pay­
ments, which has also been found to increase collective action 
(Gebara, 2013). 
Our results also demonstrate the risk of investing in activities that 
may prove ineffective at changing the incentives for households to re­
duce expansion. Neither doubling current levels of law enforcement, 
nor offering payments to individual households had any meaningful ef­
fect on reducing overall clearance and both performed poorly in com­
parison to the two collective beneﬁt sharing scenarios. With respect to 
enforcement, the results conﬁrm previous studies that suggest that 
the effectiveness of law enforcement in Cambodia is weak in situations 
where expected penalties are low (Claridge et al., 2005; Travers et al., 
2011). This is unsurprising in a country such as Cambodia, where the 
“rule of law” is generally weak and corruption levels high (Kheang, 
2006). It is possible, however, that the effectiveness of increasing law 
enforcement effort may have been underestimated, as respondents 
were able to claim that they planned all future clearance inside commu­
nity boundaries. Compliance with community boundaries is far from 
perfect even amongst households with less than ﬁve hectares (i.e. 
those households with less than their allocation for land within commu­
nity titled areas; Travers et al., 2015). Hence, respondents may have 
been over-reporting their intention to clear in titled areas. The result 
for individual incentive payments is important because these have 
been suggested to be more effective than collective payments in other 
contexts (e.g. Narloch et al., 2012). From this previous work it might 
easily have been assumed that individual payments are a viable or supe­
rior alternative to collective payments for Seima, yet this has been 
shown not to be the case. 
Finally, the results of the two scenarios in which the price of cassava 
was changed offer some perspective on the risk of assuming the contin­
uation of business as usual conditions when planning conservation in­
terventions. Until 2005, cassava made up a negligible proportion of 
total cultivated area in the study site. Since that time, however, the 
area of land under cassava cultivation has increased exponentially and 
many households now only grow cassava (Travers et al., 2015). The unforeseen introduction of a new cash crop has, in just a short space 
of time, had a dramatic inﬂuence on both the landscape and people's 
livelihoods. This is a salutary lesson in how quickly the context in 
which conservation interventions are implemented can change. From 
the observed effects of increasing the price of cassava, it is evident 
that exogenous changes may bring about differences in future clearance 
rates in some areas that are comparable to the reductions achieved by 
planned interventions. This may also have implications for interven­
tions aiming to increase the proﬁtability of cassava, for example through 
agricultural intensiﬁcation (Milne et al., 2012), which could result in 
perverse incentives to clear additional forest. 
5.2. Value of predictive approaches 
Predictive methods, of which scenario-based interviews are one, en­
able policy makers and conservation managers to test their understand­
ing of a system and allow them to base decisions on evidence rather 
than opinion (Addison et al., 2013). In this study, the hypotheses for be­
haviour change under the various scenarios were developed based on 
expert opinion (in this case the authors' understanding of site to 
which they are well acquainted) and were largely supported by the 
model results. In many ways, this suggests that a good understanding 
of the drivers of behaviour in a conservation area may be sufﬁcient to 
anticipate the likely effects of certain interventions but it also highlights 
the dangers of reliance on expert experience, which is predominantly 
used in conservation management (Pullin and Knight, 2005). Although 
individual performance payments were not expected to result in as 
many households reducing clearance than under collective perfor­
mance payments, they were expected to perform well in comparison 
to business as usual. 
Through this case study, we have illustrated the value that the appli­
cation of predictive approaches to conservation, such as scenario inter­
views, can bring to the design of conservation interventions. Amongst 
predictive approaches, scenario-based interview are one that lend 
themselves particularly well to being applied by conservation man­
agers, rather than relying on external technical expertise, as they are 
straightforward to conduct and can be implemented with considerably 
lower investment in time and money than a pilot of any of the options 
considered would have required. In this instance, despite a small sample 
size and the resultant wide credible intervals on the derived probability 
estimates, we identiﬁed the type of intervention most likely to have the 
desired impact on behaviour (collective performance payments) and 
recognised that responses to that intervention are likely to be spatially 
heterogeneous, as well as identifying potential issues that may prevent 
successful implementation (the need for collective action and possible 
increases in the price of cassava) and discounting approaches that 
might otherwise have been considered credible options. In so doing, 
we were able to control for a number of complex contextual factors, 
such as the on-going land tenure reform process and the rapid 
commercialisation of agricultural practices in the area. The evidence 
provided through this approach is potentially invaluable for conserva­
tion managers as they decide how to deploy limited resources. 
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